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Abstract
Something must be structurally wrong in a labour market when a well developed economy like 
that of South Africa is not able to absorb and allocate an accumulating surplus of labour over a 
period of 20 years or longer but has instead moved to the use of more capital-intensive technology. 
The objective of this paper is to analyse the role labour conflict plays in the persistence of macro 
underemployment in South Africa. For the analysis two models identified from the literature were 
used. In these models labour conflict originates from an over-regulated labour market where labour 
appropriates capital and bad or hostile labour relations. In both models the switch to technology 
leads to underemployment. It was found that bad labour relations contribute to the persistence 




The long period of positive economic growth, 
relatively low interest rates, low inflation 
and positive business sentiment has not been 
reflected in job creation in South Africa. 
Amidst a condition of rising employment 
and unemployment levels, the South African 
economy has also seen a significant increase in 
atypical employment since the mid-1990s. This 
includes arrangements such as outsourcing, 
labour brokering and part-time contracts 
(Bhorat & Van der Westhuizen, 2009: 3).
Gupta and du Toit (2009: 8) emphasise the 
skills shortage as well as high fixed costs of 
hiring as the main sources of unemployment. 
The South African labour market has also 
been subjected to the long run effects of 
structural shifts as well as technological change 
in the economy. The structural shift caused a 
shift in output away from the primary sectors 
towards the service sectors of the South African 
economy (Bhorat, 2004: 944). The technological 
adjustment referred to the advent of the micro-
electronics revolution as well as significant 
increases in the capital/labour ratios (Bhorat, 
2004: 945–946).
Previous research shows that a possible 
reason for this phenomenon lies in sunk cost 
associated with and/or uncertainty about labour 
in South Africa (Schoeman & Blaauw, 2007). It 
is suspected that the associated sunk cost and/or 
uncertainty about labour stems from a history 
of labour conflict in South Africa. The macro 
underemployment referred to in this paper, 
as reflected in the a high and persistent level 
of unemployment, is seen as a consequence of 
an intentional decision by firms, not driven by 
efficiency considerations, to substitute labour 
with capital in the production process. 
In this paper persistence is seen as the 
result of a continued presence of factor effects 
that initiate the original decision to shift to 
technology in favour of labour. Labour conflict, 
the long-run nature of technology choice (the 
irreversibility of fixed investment), the limited 
scope to employ labour once the technology 
choice has been made (inflexibility of capital), 
capital deepening, slow renovation of capital 
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and technology sclerosis, all result in inefficient 
factor allocation and macro underemployment 
(Caballero & Hammour, 1997; Blanchard & 
Phillipon, 2006). The objective of this paper is 
therefore to analyse the possibility that labour 
conflict is a major contribution to the persistence 
of macro underemployment (referred to as 
underemployment in the rest of the paper) and 
highly stable unemployment in South Africa. 
This study sets out to determine what 
influences a firm’s decision in favour of new 
technology over labour. It is probable that the 
same factors that influenced past decisions on 
substituting labour with capital are still present 
in decisions on technology, and, therefore, 
will continue to influence the persistence of 
underemployment. The hypothesis of this paper 
is that labour conflict in South Africa contributes 
to the persistence of underemployment in South 
Africa. 
The paper will first analyse recent literature 
on the role of labour conflict in the creation 
of underemployment and high unemployment 
equilibrium levels. The applicability of the 
theories and results will be interpreted for South 
Africa. The results will act as a basis for an 
empirical analysis of the role played by labour 
conflict in the persistence of underemployment 
in South Africa. 
2 
Literature overview
The channels by which labour conflict contributes 
to underemployment and high equilibrium levels 
of unemployment will be analysed in this section. 
Two traditions are involved in labour conflict 
in unemployment, are Classical and Marxist. 
The role played by power and conflict in 
employment is traditionally suppressed in 
Classical economic theory by assuming non-
cooperative bargaining in competitive markets 
by multiple rational optimising and anonymous 
agents (labour and firms). The agents are price 
takers with no power over prices and quantity 
makers with complete power over quantities. 
The agents can therefore buy and sell any 
quantity at the going rate. These assumptions 
ensure a (powerless, harmonious) economic 
world of full employment equilibrium.
Evidence on increased labour power, labour 
conflict and the persistence of unemployment 
are accommodated in adapted models of 
the Classical theory. Labour power in these 
adaptive versions can lead to medium-run 
unemployment. In the first model the increased 
labour power and associated overpricing of 
labour lead to disenfranchised labour that 
cannot exert demand pressure on wages and 
to short-run underemployment. In the second 
model the increase in labour power leads to a 
temporary increase in interest, and a decrease 
in investment and growth, which results in 
medium-run unemployment. The assumption in 
this model is that the propensity to save is higher 
through profits than wages. The underlying 
economic reality (structure of the labour and 
commodity markets respectively) will ensure a 
return to long-run full employment equilibrium 
(Hicks, 1974; Layard, Nickell & Jackman, 1991 
and Friedman, 1968: 9)
Conflict as a determinant of high levels of 
equilibrium unemployment and persistent 
underemployment originates from and is central 
to the Marxian tradition. Broadly underlying the 
tradition and related theories is the assumption 
of an environment of cooperative bargaining, 
where historical (past distributional outcomes) 
and social elements (custom) motivate wage and 
profit aspirations. According to this tradition 
equilibrium underemployment is the result 
of employer power or command over labour 
(control of labour effort) that originates from 
the existence of continuous underemployment, 
employment rent (resulting in job losses 
constituting a cost for labour) and endogenous 
technology. 
In most economies, institutions administer and 
manage the functioning of the labour market. 
The institutions in question include: employer 
and employee organisations, the courts of 
law including specialist courts, institutions 
of dispute resolution, ministries of labour or 
employment, collective bargaining institutions 
and tripartite institutions (Bhorat & Van der 
Westhuizen, 2009: 19). The various influencing 
factors are all time and context-dependent. This 
will fundamentally change the way in which 
labour regulatory stipulations provisions impact 
on the broader economy (Bhorat & Van der 
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Westhuizen, 2009: 19). History and sociology 
determine the institutional arrangements 
that govern these labour market particulars, 
and their effects on wage and profit rates 
(distribution of income) and employment. 
Firms own and control technology and the 
technology choice is aimed at maximising 
profit. Firms may, in reaction to conflict with 
labour over new demands on the distribution of 
income, choose inefficient technology (capital 
deepening), which results in underemployment 
and reduces income as long as the greater part 
goes to profit. Through technology choice 
conflict in the labour market can therefore 
result in persistent underemployment. Multiple 
underemployment equilibriums determined by 
historic and social considerations are therefore 
possible (Bowles & Gintis, 1990; Hicks, 1974 
and Skott, 1991). 
Labour conflict has different dimensions and, 
in the interest of analytical clarity, is divided 
here into two forms, namely distributional 
and relational conflict. Two recent studies 
investigated how these different forms of labour 
conflict can affect equilibrium unemployment 
(Caballero & Hammour, 1997 and Blanchard 
& Phillipon, 2006). This paper borrows from 
both. Labour conflict in these two theories 
leads to inefficiencies in production and to 
underemployment. In their study, Caballero 
and Hammour (1997) find that conflict in 
the distribution of income can, because 
of a substantial buildup of institutions in 
favour of labour (intervention in favour of 
labour), lead through a shift in technology to 
underemployment. Blanchard and Phillipon 
(2006) find that the quality of labour relations 
or relational conflict rather than institutional 
buildup in favour of labour, results in country-
unique unemployment equilibriums.
Caballero and Hammour (1997; the CH 
model) view distributional conflict, in the form 
of the appropriation of capital by labour, as 
the cause of inefficiency in production. This 
results in underemployment. The outcome of 
appropriability depends on the respective supply 
elasticities of labour and capital, the degree to 
which they need each other in production and 
institutional buildup in favour of labour. The 
low elasticity of capital in the short run makes 
it possible for labour to then appropriate capital 
(growth of the labour share in production in 
expense of capital) through the institutional 
buildup in favour of labour. However, in 
the long run, capital is much more flexible 
and will develop new, less labour-intensive 
technologies that will guarantee capital returns 
equivalent to what capital can get elsewhere 
in the world. Investment and unemployment 
will increase over the longer run. The cost in 
this inefficient allocation of labour and capital 
will in the long run be carried by labour in the 
form of a decrease in labour share and greater 
unemployment in favour of a recovery in capital 
profitability. The inefficiency in production 
will result in underemployment, excessively 
slow renovation of capital and technological 
sclerosis. The latter is because of the increase 
in the duration of unemployment that leads to 
falling shadow (reserve) wages or increased 
costs of unemployment, downward pressure on 
wages and therefore lower pressure to scrap less 
productive units.
Instead of hiring more labour at lower 
wages, as predicted by classical theory, firms 
instead choose to over-use existing capital 
units. Labour is worse off and capital better 
off under conditions of underemployment. 
The new unemployment equilibrium is not 
dependent on the factors that created it anymore 
and is primarily the result of inefficient factor 
allocation because of a switch in production 
technology in favour of long-run inflexible 
capital because of these factors. Labour will not 
share in increased investment and growth in a 
heavily regulated market. 
A comparative study done on countries 
with similar formal institutions and economic 
environments shows that these countries 
experience different (idiosyncratic) levels of 
unemployment (Blanchard & Phillipon, 2006). 
The cause of these discrepancies lies in the 
various labour histories of these countries. 
The study finds that the quality of labour 
institutions arising from labour history rather 
than formal labour institutions per se is the 
reason for these differences and idiosyncratic 
equilibrium rates of unemployment. According 
to Blanchard and Phillipon (2006; the BP 
Model), equilibrium unemployment in a country 
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is the combined result of a history of bad or 
hostile labour relations driven by country-
specific characteristics (the state’s historic 
attitude to early unions in the 19th century in 
Europe for instance, or in general, the origin, 
purpose, development and nature of these 
institutions).
Relatively high equilibrium rates of unemploy-
ment are associated with a history of hostile 
labour relations that resulted in a period 
of frequent bargaining failures and a high 
frequency of strikes. This situation incurs costs 
and creates uncertainty about labour and future 
production. Adverse shocks increase uncertainty 
at firm level and exacerbate the situation even 
further. The bargaining failures accompanied by 
strikes result in high cost (dead weight loss) and 
lower surplus for the firms to allocate, leaving 
them even more prone to future strikes. Labour 
becomes a high cost and uncertain production 
factor for the firm. The endogenous nature of 
technology makes it possible for the firm to 
switch to more certain or less risky capital in 
the form of capital-intensive technology. Once 
the switch has taken place uncertainties and 
cost are hedged in long-run inflexible capital. 
Adverse shocks, bad labour relations and strikes 
no longer have the same effect on employment. 
The resultant underemployment then becomes 
equilibrium unemployment. 
Current hostile labour relations and 
underemployment in this model are associated 
with a high levels of strikes in the past. A 
causal relationship exists between the quality 
of labour relations, adverse shocks, the cost of 
strikes, uncertainty about productivity, as well 
as the switch to technology and equilibrium 
underemployment. The quality of labour 
relations depends on the degree of trust in 
the economy and is based on the reputation of 
truth telling (on productivity and surplus to be 
divided between capital and labour) of firms. 
Bargaining failures as expressed by strike activity 
is an indication of firms’ reputations, labour’s 
militancy and the quality of labour relations 
in the country in general. High strike activity 
is positively related to labour militancy and 
negatively related to the reputation of the firms, 
the degree of trust, the quality of labour relations 
and employment (Blanchard & Phillipon, 2006). 
Countries with bad labour relations have 
comparatively higher rates of unemployment 
equilibrium (Blanchard & Phillipon, 2006). 
Labour will not share in increased investment 
and growth in a hostile labour market. Heavily 
regulated labour markets (intervention in favour 
of labour) are therefore not the reason per se for 
underemployment but rather the way in which 
these institutions were used for the settlement 
of historical conflict. 
Both the CH and BP models implicitly 
or explicitly address economic, historical, 
and sociological aspects related to labour 
conflict as factors to explain equilibrium 
underemployment. Both models also give an 
explanation of the switch to technology through 
which distributional and relational conflict 
can create inefficiency in factor allocation and 
underemployment. Distributional conflict for 
the CH model originates from institutional 
buildup in favour of labour and the appropriation 
of capital, while for the BP model relational 
conflict stems from bad labour relations. In 
both cases, the result is new equilibrium levels 
of underemployment.
3 
Labour conflict and the shift  
in production technology in  
South Africa 
Distributional and relational conflict in South 
Africa will be analysed in this section. Events 
in the labour history will be interpreted to give 
a general understanding of those characteristics 
concerning labour conflict that are specific 
to South Africa. The section will analyse and 
interpret events running up to the 1980s and 
1990s, which are characterised as periods of 
great transformation and the institutionalisation 
of the labour market in South Africa. The 
1970s in South Africa, however, marked the 
start of increasing unemployment, which led 
to the current high level of unemployment. 
Common characteristics of labour relations in 
South Africa are historical racial conflict, low 
levels of trust and then open conflict between 
labour and business since the 70s. Evident 
from the beginning of the 70s is the substantial 
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institutional buildup in favour of labour, open 
labour militancy, periodic strikes, continuous 
increase in the capital/output ratio and the start 
of continued increasing unemployment. 
3.1 Institutional buildup, appropriation,  
 bad labour relations and 
 uncertainty about labour in South 
 Africa
Labour market history in South Africa is 
overshadowed by racially dominated politics, 
institutionalised racial labour structures, and, 
since the seventies, open racially based labour 
market conflict. This means that the wages the 
market naturally reflected have historically 
been seen by labour as more of a customary or 
race-based convention than as a reflection of 
the interaction between the supply and demand 
for skilled and unskilled workers (Fick & High, 
1987). The historical reason for this is the racially 
based policies of government, legislation, unions 
and the division between white skilled labour, 
at best passive concentrated overwhelming 
white business favoured by government up to 
1994, and unskilled black labour. The 1980s 
were characterised by increased institutional 
buildup in favour of unskilled labour, primarily 
to resolve labour conflict through business by 
renegotiating labour share in production. 
The increased regulation of the labour market 
gave labour a strong platform not only to 
negotiate better wages but also to drive political 
goals (Jones & Inggs, 1994). By the end of 1977, 
between 55 000 and 70 000 workers out of a total 
black workforce of 7 million were believed to 
belong to 27 unregistered black trade unions. 
This represented about one percent of the total 
black workforce. In 2005 the figure was around 3 
million trade union members – about 40 per cent 
of the formally employed labour force, excluding 
the agricultural sector, domestic workers and 
self-employed persons. This represents an 
annual increase of nearly 6 per cent. According 
the International Labour Organisation, this is 
the highest increase among the 92 countries 
that it surveyed in its annual study of the world’s 
labour markets (Barker, 2007: 93).
The gradual institutional buildup in favour 
of labour started in 1973 after unaccustomed 
demonstrations by workers in the Natal textile 
industry and legislation in the form of the Bantu 
Labour Relations Act. In the end, the strikes 
involved an estimated 60 000 to 100 000 black 
employees from the brick, textile chemical, 
rubber, iron, steel, electrical services and 
municipal service in Durban and surrounding 
areas (Van der Velden & Visser, 2006). In 
reaction to the demonstrations, provision 
was made for a committee of non-union 
representation on the enterprise level. In 1977, 
the government appointed a commission (the 
Wiehahn Commission) to enquire into labour 
legislation. The majority of the Commission’s 
proposals were accepted. The report included 
proposals on the registration of black trade 
unions and the abolition of statutory job 
reservation (Van der Velden & Visser, 2006). 
The inclusion of the proposals in the Labour 
Relations Act in 1979 marked the beginning of 
the growth of black trade union movement and 
their political influence.
The trade union movement in South Africa is 
a powerful one. It has aligned itself with the new 
government in South Africa. Furthermore, there 
is an institutional framework – the Bargaining 
Councils and Wage Boards – to set minimum 
wages in much of the formal sector (Kingdon 
& Knight 2001a: 5–6). These regulations are 
extended to all firms in the industry, irrespective 
of size (Kingdon & Knight, 2001b: 9–10). 
Kingdon and Knight (2001a: 5–6) further raise 
the point that it would be interesting to see 
whether this implies that wages will be less 
responsive to local unemployment conditions 
than in countries with weaker unionisation and 
weaker wage-setting institutions.
In a relatively short period the unions, led by 
the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(which represented both industrial and general 
worker unions under one umbrella), developed 
into a formidable economic and political force. 
The political agenda of the black unions was 
explicitly foregrounded when it confronted state 
policy on a number of issues. One element of 
the agenda was a vote for disinvestment in South 
Africa. This development also pulled business 
into the political arena (Fick & High, 1987). 
Increased pressure on foreign companies to 
sign the Sullivan code and lobbying by Cosatu 
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to disinvest led to the pull-out of a significant 
number of US firms (including IBM, Coca Cola, 
and General Motors). The role of trade unions 
in South African society therefore became 
increasingly political in nature. Trade unions 
were seen as a vehicle for liberation from 
oppression. From 1973 labour and since the 80s 
unions like the National Union of Mineworkers 
(NUM) grew rapidly and steadily became 
more militant. This culminated in a three-week 
strike in 1987. The intensity of the conflict and 
militancy of labour is reflected in the fact that 
nine people were killed and 500 injured during 
this strike.
Organised business was not ready for 
militant black trade unions. The new industrial 
relations system did not contribute much to the 
establishment of sound collective relationships 
at the time. It was seen rather as a frame 
of reference for conflict handling, whereby 
employers tried to restrict conflict and the 
government resorted to the tactic of buying time 
(Slabbert, 1999). The period 1973 to 1987 was 
characterised by the increase in labour unrest, 
real wages and labour share in production. 
Strikes during this time increased rapidly to 
reach a high in 1987. Real wages for Africans 
in the non-primary sector rose by 2,9 per cent 
per annum on average between 1975 and 1990 
(Hofmeyr, 1994). This indicates that conflict 
was not only political but also related to the 
distribution of income. 
The change in the political dispensation in 
1994 gave extra momentum to labour in the form 
of government’s alliance with labour, greater 
political intervention, and the introduction of 
minimum wages, social charges on payrolls and 
job protection through legislation (Kingdon & 
Knight 2001a: 5–6; Kingdon & Knight 2001b). 
The relatively quick and radical changes in the 
field of labour created a lot of uncertainty for 
business. This included the militancy of labour, 
newly formed unions, the rapid development of 
unions into formidable political and economic 
forces, the historical absence of a formal 
collective framework to handle conflict between 
labour and business and the political nature of 
the labour conflict. History also did not leave 
labour with much reason to trust business. The 
overall uncertainty was aggravated by historical 
adverse shocks of increasing political instability, 
the debt crisis, sanctions, disinvestment, 
increased internal war effort and the beginning 
of globalisation.
3.2 The changing role of capital in 
 production in South Africa since 
 the 70s
According to Bhorat and Hodge (1999), since 
the 1970s a structural change in the economy 
and a technological change in production 
(greater capital intensity) were evident in 
individual sectors of the economy. The capital 
deepening had its biggest effect on the primary 
and secondary sectors while microelectronics 
mostly impacted on the service sectors. The 
findings illustrate the direct and indirect roles 
played by technical change (more capital-
intensive technologies) within sectors with 
poor job creating ability, especially in the 
lower skilled occupations of the formal sector 
and unemployment since the mid-eighties. 
Bhorat and Hodge (1999) suggest that the 
changes in production methods may partly be a 
consequence of trade liberalisation and a search 
for efficiency, which led to unemployment in 
previously protected manufacturing industries. 
However, it is uncertain to what extent trade 
liberalisation contributed to these changes. 
Studies done by Van Dijk (2003) and McCarthy 
(2005) indicate that the change in technology did 
not resolve the problem of relatively low total 
factor productivity. The relative performance in 
productivity has in fact decreased since 1970. It 
therefore seems that the reason for the shift in 
technology was not to implement more efficient 
technology but was driven by factors other than 
efficiency considerations alone. If the shift was 
aimed at greater efficiency, productivity would 
have caught up or at least led to a relatively stable 
gap in productivity after the shift. According 
to Van Dijk (2003) and McCarthy (2005) the 
reason for the inefficiency lies in ideology and 
politics. This took the form of strict import 
substitution to build large capital investments at 
the cost of labour (Van Dijk, 2003) and political 
ideology (McCarthy, 2005) that constrained, 
and still constrains market forces. Factors other 
than classical economic ones only, impact on 
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inefficient factor allocation and relatively low 
total productivity in South Africa. The decision 
to shift to more capital-intensive technology was 
not a classical economic decision, it seems, but 
was influenced and may still be influenced by 
non-economic considerations. 
4 
Evidence on labour conflict, the 
substitution of labour and the 
persistence of underemployment in 
South Africa
Bhorat and Hodge (1999) found that the 
increased use of capital in the method of 
production or capital deepening did change 
the nature of the demand for labour and did 
contribute to the large pool of unemployed, 
especially among the unskilled in South Africa. 
It is evident from the empirical analysis that 
hostile labour relations did contribute (and 
continue to do so) to the use of capital-intensive 
technology. Although capital deepening did 
change the nature of demand for labour, which 
in turn contributed to unemployment, it is labour 
militancy that translates into unemployment. 
The labour militancy contributes to the 
continued inefficient factor allocation, which 
results in the persistence of underemployment 
in South Africa. The long period of economic 
growth, relatively low interest rates, low inflation 
and positive business sentiment is therefore not 
reflected in job creation in South Africa (see also 
Caballero & Hammour, 1997, on this).
Previous research (Schoeman, Blaauw & 
Pretorius, 2008; Schoeman & Blaauw, 2007) 
indicates that unemployment is endogenously 
determined by economic as well as institutional 
factors in South Africa and that sunk costs 
and uncertainty about labour as a production 
factor in combination with extreme adverse 
historical shocks in the eighties possibly led to 
the unemployment that we now experience. It is 
therefore possible that the associated sunk costs 
due to an institutional buildup (intervention) in 
favour of labour and uncertainty about labour 
because of the history of labour conflict could 
have influenced the structure of labour demand 
that led to a movement in the production process 
away from labour, to capital. Uncertainty about 
labour can result in more capital-intensive 
technology or capital deepening even in 
the longer run. It is therefore possible that 
distributional as well as relational conflict could 
have created sunk costs (the introduction of 
minimum wages, social charges on payrolls 
and job protection through legislation) and 
uncertainty about labour that resulted in the 
substitution of labour with capital – and hence 
underemployment in South Africa.
4.1 Empirical analysis of labour  
 conflict and unemployment in 
 South Africa
4.1.1 Specification of the model
The limitations of this type of study are 
misspecification. A simultaneous equation 
model to simulate unemployment in South 
Africa may be more appropriate. Dummies 
also carry all the subjectivity of their creator. 
Furthermore, the possibility exists that the 
dummies may continuously or periodically over- 
or under-accentuate the qualitative information 
they carry and, in addition, the information 
a dummy is carrying may be incomplete for 
the same reason. Previous research, in which 
underlying theory has proven to be the basis 
on which the dummies are defined and the 
conformation of results to theory and reality 
which it is trying to explain is bounded by this 
probability. According to Rogers (1989), the key 
feature of partial equilibrium analysis as applied 
in this study is its notional ability to determine 
causality, even on the macro level. Well-founded 
simple and elegant partial equilibrium analysis 
can therefore contribute to the understanding 
of certain economic phenomena.
Labour conflict in this paper is divided into 
two forms namely distributional and relational 
conflict. This is based on two studies that 
investigated how these two forms of labour 
conflict affect equilibrium unemployment 
(Caballero & Hammour, 1997; Blanchard & 
Phillipon, 2006). The findings of these studies 
are that labour conflict leads to inefficiencies in 
production and underemployment.
The CH model finds that conflict through 
institutions in favour of labour, through a shift 
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in technology, leads to underemployment. 
The appropriation of capital by labour 
is the cause of inefficiency in production 
and underemployment. The outcome of 
appropriability depends on the respective supply 
elasticities of labour and capital. Low capital 
elasticity in the short-run makes it possible for 
labour to appropriate capital.
The BP model f inds that  relational 
conflict in favour of labour results in country 
unique unemployment equilibrium. High 
unemployment is associated with a history of 
hostile labour relations that resulted in a period 
of frequent bargaining and a high frequency of 
strikes. This result is a switch to capital-intensive 
technology. Once the switch has taken place 
uncertainties and cost were hedged in long-run 
inflexible capital. Relational conflict then no 
longer has the same effect on employment – 
underemployment then becomes equilibrium 
unemployment.
Both these models result in new equilibrium 
unemployment due to a switch to capital-
intensive technology. To determine if such a 
switch to capital intensive technology in South 
Africa is eminent, distributional and relational 
conflict as explanatory variables will be used to 
explain the capital/ output ratio in South Africa.
Yt = a0 + 1X1 + 2X2 + 3X3 + 4D1 + 5D2 + t
Where:
Yt  = Capital/output ratio (CO)
X1 = Labour share (LS)
X2 = Frequency of strikes (STRIKES)
X3 = Real interest rate (RR)
D1 = institutional dummy (DUM)
D2 = HIV/AIDS prevalence dummy (AIDS)
The capital/ output ratio is used as the dependent 
variable since it gives a good indication of 
the role capital plays in production. The 
frequency of strikes was used as a proxy for 
the relational conflict variable (BP model) 
and the compensation of employees to gross 
value added ratio was used as a proxy for the 
distributional conflict variable to represent 
labour share (CH model). A dummy variable 
was created for intervention by institutions in 
favour of labour. It was based on important 
historical events or legislation that occurred 
in the South African labour market. Virtually 
all of the institutional developments after 1973 
were in favour of labour as a production factor 
(See exposition of rationale in 3.1). Table 1 
provides a summary of the events deserving of 
a pro-labour classification of the institutional 
dummy variable.
A new dummy for each individual piece 
of legislation was also considered. However, 
the effect of each piece of legislation is not 
calculated after only one period. The aim of the 
paper is to focus on the general impact of labour 
legislation and therefore a single institutional 
dummy was preferred. Every time such an 
occasion was deemed to have a favourable 
outcome for labour as a production factor, a 
value of 1 was given to the variable.
The real interest rate and the HIV/AIDS 
prevalence dummy were used as control 
variables for possible specification bias. It was 
assumed that HIV/AIDS prevalence started 
in 1990 because according to UNAIDS/WHO 
(2006), between 1990 and 2003 – a period during 
which HIV/AIDS prevalence in South Africa 
increased dramatically – the country fell by 35 
places in the Human Development Index.
Data were used on an annual basis from 1970 
to 2004. The capital/output ratio, compensation 
of employees, gross value added, interest rates 
and the inflation rate were obtained from the 
South African Reserve Bank data bank via 
Quantec Research. The frequency of strikes 
was obtained from Dr Sjaak van der Velden. 
He is a researcher at the International Institute 




Institutional developments deserving of a pro-labour classification of  
the institutional dummy variable
Year	 Institutional	development
1960 – 1972	 No significant developments 
1973	 	 Amendment – Bantu Labour Relations Act
1974 	 Trade Union Advisory and Coordinating Council




1979 	 Amendment – Industrial Conciliation Act
1980





1986 	 Abolition of Influx Control Act
1987
1988 	 Amendment – Industrial Conciliation Act
1989
1990
1991 	 Laboria Minute
1992 	 Labour Relations Act 
1993 	 Agricultural Labour Act 1993; Public Service Labour Relations Act 1993
1994
1995 	 New Labour Relations Act 1995
1996 	 Amendment – Labour Relations Act 1996 and Proclamation Act 1996
1997 	 Basic Conditions of Employment Act 1997
1998 	 Amendment – Labour Relations Act 1998
1999 	 Skills Development Act 1999
2000 	 Amendment – Labour Relations Act 2000
2001
2002 	 Amendment – Labour Relations Act 2002
2003 – 2006	 No significant developments 
Source: Authors’ own compilation from various sources
4.1.2 Diagnostic tests
Stationarity tests were conducted on all the said 
variables and it was found that all the variables 
were I(1). Second-order testing indicated that no 
serious autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and 
mulitcollinearity were present. The residuals 
were normally distributed (See appendix A). 
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Table	2	
Stationarity test results for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Phillips-Perron in brackets)
Variable Trend,	intercept,	none Level 1st	difference
Capital output Intercept –2.54 (–2.51) –4.68* (–4.67*)
Labour share Trend and intercept –2.58 (–2.39) –6.07* (–8.08*)
Strikes None –1.31 (–1.17) –5.82* (–5.87*)
Real interest rate None –1.91 (–1.007) –4.79* (–5.76*)
* Rejection of the 5 per cent critical value (Ho: variable contains a unit root)
4.1.3 Estimation of the model
Sequential ad hoc estimation was conducted on 
the function adding all the lags, for example, 
adding lag 1 to 7 for labour share. This ad hoc 
estimation suffers from problems such as no a 
priori guide as to what the maximum lag should 
be and it also causes fewer degrees of freedom 
left, which compromises statistical inference, 
especially in this case, since annual data were 
used. In addition, successive lags tend to be 
highly correlated causing higher standard errors 
in relation to the estimation. (Gujarati & Porter, 
2008). The lag structure was therefore based 
upon prior theoretical considerations as well as 
documented experiences of businesses’ decision- 
taking periods, which resulted in the lags as set 
out in the function.
A variety of theoretical literature exists to 
explain discontinuities and discrete adjustment 
in economics. See for instance Hamermesh 
(1989), Blinder (1981), Bernanke (1983), 
Pindyck (1991), Dixit (1992), Caballero and 
Engel (1992) as well as the work of Cross (1994).
Uncertainty about labour as a production 
factor and institutional friction and cost are 
the main theoretical reasons for the long 
lag of the labour share effect on the capital/
output ratio. Beliefs based on non-economic 
factors like mistrust, are the reason why the 
transmission becomes significant after a long 
period. (Blanchard & Phillipon, 2006). When 
technology becomes available it is implemented 
as soon as it is profitable to introduce, even 
if shocks had taken place a long time before 
and should already have been worked out and 
adjustment seems to have nothing to do with 
the original shock.
The outcome of appropriability depends on 
the respective supply of elasticities of labour 
and capital, the degree to which they need 
each other in production and the institutional 
buildup in favour of labour. The low elasticity 
of capital in the short run makes it possible for 
labour to appropriate capital in the short run 
(growth of the labour share in production at 
the expense of capital) through the institutional 
buildup in favour of labour. Capital is however 
much more flexible in the long run and will 
develop new, less labour-intensive technologies 
that will guarantee capital returns equivalent 
to what capital can get elsewhere in the world. 
Investment and unemployment will increase 
over the longer run (Caballero & Hammour, 
1997). 
The cost in this inefficient allocation of labour 
and capital will be borne by labour in the form of 
a decrease in labour share or change in capital 
share and greater unemployment in favour of a 
recovery in capital profitability in the long run. 
The lag in the effect of appropriation on 
capital depends on the endogenous nature and 
therefore the elasticity of supply and demand 
of capital intensive technologies. The latter is 
also influenced by the profitability and service 
life of existing capital as well as investment 
incentives (Caballero & Hammour, 1997). 
The relatively long lag between the increase in 
appropriation (labour share) and the decrease in 
profits and deepening of capital (capital/output 
ratio) can be explained as the result of the time 
taken to develop capital intensive technologies 
and the cost of substituting labour for capital. 
The inelasticity seems to lead to responses to 
shocks of up to 19 years in France (Caballero & 
Hammour, 1997: 5–7; 14 and 21). In a developing 
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country such as Argentina the lag is much 
shorter because capital intensive technologies 
had already existed in Europe and because of 
globalisation it took less time to implement. 
This makes it easier and cheaper to substitute 
labour for capital (Caballero & Hammour, 
1997: 22). The experiences of emerging market 
countries like Argentina formed the theoretical 
foundation for the chosen lag length of seven 
years of the labour share variable.
In the short run the reaction after strikes and 
other shocks is more severe in labour markets 
characterised by bad labour relations and 
mistrust. The effects of these shocks, exogenous 
and endogenous, are also of a long run nature 
(Blanchard & Phillipon, 2006: 21–22).
A recent case study of a leading retail company 
indicates that the real cost of strikes and other 
shocks take around two years to formally work 
through the management activities of companies 
(ER Report, 2010). The company faced 
significant strike action from 17 September 2008 
until 20 October 2008. However, the last award 
by the CCMA stemming from the strike activity 
and the response of the company was only made 
in April 2010 (ER Report, 2010). 
This market experience informed the chosen 
lag length of the strikes variable in the analysis. 
Increase in actual unemployment as a response 
to strikes and other shocks, for example HIV/
AIDS, are reflected in the capital/output 
ratio data after approximately two years. The 
short run effect on the capital/output ratio is 
due to the initial increase in unemployment 
and resulted increase in capital’s share of 
production. The period of two years in terms 
of the decision-making processes of businesses 
was also used as a benchmark for the chosen 
lag length of the institutional dummy variable. 
The two year benchmark also informed the 
lag length of the real interest rate variable. The 
period of five years is based on the difference 
in the time period from employer’s decision to 
substitute labour with capital and the seven years 
it takes for this capital deepening to become 
visible. Theoretically, this makes the cost of 
capital relevant after a period of approximately 
five years.
Furthermore, specific attention was given 
to the lag length to be employed for the HIV/
AIDS variable. The literature suggests that 
the information about the rate at which the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic is developing is relatively 
plausible. However, information on the rate at 
which the epidemic is destroying the economic 
and development potential of the economy is not 
sufficient. This leads to substantial uncertainty 
about the macroeconomic impact of HIV/
AIDS on the South African economy (Booysen, 
Geldenhuys & Marinkov, 2003: 11–12).
Terwin (2004: 1) conducted the largest survey 
on the impact of HIV/AIDS on business in South 
Africa up to that point. The results show that 34 
per cent of the 1006 participating companies 
reported that HIV/AIDS has already had a 
depressing effect on profit levels. Moreover, 
more than half expected an adverse impact 
on profitability within a five year framework 
(Terwin, 2004: 1). A lag length of three years for 
the HIV/AIDS dummy was used as a benchmark 
for the economic cost of the epidemic to 
manifest itself. 
The estimation of the model yielded the 
following results as summarised in Table 3
Table	3	
Regression results
Dependent variable: capital output
Method: least squares
Sample (adjusted): 1977–2004
Coefficient Std.	error t-statistic Prob.		
C 3.794711 0.481619 7.879081 0.0000
LS(-7) –2.453351 0.855084 –2.869135 0.0089
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STRIKES(-2) 0.000288 4.27E-05 6.745689 0.0000
RR(-5) –0.018075 0.003943 –4.584490 0.0001
DUM(-2) –0.168158 0.050066 –3.358737 0.0028
AIDS(-3) 0.049897 0.041720 1.196010 0.2444
R-squared 0.766176     Mean dependent var 2.492857
Adjusted R-squared 0.713035     S.D. dependent var 0.143833
S.E. of regression 0.077050     Akaike info criterion –2.101317
Sum squared resid 0.130607     Schwarz criterion –1.815845
Log likelihood 35.41844     Hannan-Quinn criter. –2.014046
F-statistic 14.41761     Durbin-Watson stat 1.875051
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000003
Source: Eviews estimates
All the explanatory variables are statistically 
significant at the 95 per cent confidence level, 
except the HIV/AIDS prevalence dummy which 
is significant at the 75 per cent confidence level. 
The distributional conflict variable, labour 
share (LS in equation output), has a negative 
relationship with the capital/output ratio 
which is lagged with 7 periods, the coefficient 
is relatively large. This signifies that capital is 
crowded out by labour wage demands. The effect 
is therefore even worse than the findings of both 
Caballero and Hammour (1997) and Blanchard 
and Phillipon (2006). It may indicate that 
businesses cannot effectively hedge themselves 
against bad labour relations by simply making 
use of more capital intensive technology. It can 
also be an indication that skills shortages had a 
detrimental effect on production in South Africa 
much earlier than previously anticipated.
The relational conflict variable, frequency of 
strikes, has a positive relationship to the capital/
output ratio and it is significant after two years. 
The small but highly significant coefficient is 
an indication that the hedging of uncertain 
labour by using more capital intensive methods 
has been largely completed. This implies that 
as the frequency of strikes becomes higher 
the switch to capital is more likely, with the 
possible secondary effect of higher levels of 
unemployment.
The institutional dummy variable is also 
significant after two years and it has a negative 
relationship to the capital/output ratio. This 
implies that when there is intervention by 
institutions in favour of labour the capital/
output ratio decline. Contrary to the finding of 
Caballero and Hammour (1997) the regulation 
of the labour markets in South Africa, in fact 
increases employment. This finding corresponds 
with the conclusion of Blanchard and Phillipon 
(2006) that regulating as such does not create 
unemployment. Labour regulation after 1973 
in favour of labour seems to create certainty in 
the labour market as a whole. Labour regulation 
as such does not seem to be the reason for the 
substitution of labour for capital. 
The real interest rate has a negative rela-
tionship to the capital/output ratio over a long 
period of 5 years. The finding corresponds with 
that of Caballero and Hammour (1997) and 
Blanchard and Phillipon’s (2006) view on the 
inflexibility of capital intensive technology.
The HIV/AIDS prevalence dummy is not as 
significant as expected; though it has the correct 
sign, indicating that as HIV/AIDS prevalence 
increases the capital/output ratio will also 
increase. This could indicate that the switch to 
capital is driven rather by conflict variables, and 
not the fear of high labour turnover due to AIDS 
deaths. It can also be that the earlier shift to 
capital intensive production already makes the 
influence of HIV/AIDS less visible. Therefore 
uncertainty on the labour market was already 
hedged but for reasons other than HIV/AIDS.
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From the magnitude of the coefficients it can 
be said that the distributional conflict variable 
and the institutional dummy variable have the 
largest impact on the capital/output ratio. The 
adjusted R2 indicates that 71 per cent of the 
capital/output ratio is due to the explanatory 
variables and the F-statistic (p=0) indicates that 
the capital/output ratio jointly is significantly 
explained by all the explanatory variables. 
4.2 Co-integration analysis
Since the variables are integrated to the same 
order, cointegration analysis can be conducted 
to establish if a long-run equilibrium relationship 
exists between the variables in the model and to 
rule out the possibility of spurious regression. 
The Schwarz information criteria (SIC) and 
the Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ) 
indicated that the optimal lag structure is 1 lag 
(up to 4 lags were tested), this is appropriate, 
since annual data are analysed and a longer lag 
structure will create problems in motivating 
cointegration. The results are presented in the 
table below. One cointegrating relationship as 
indicated by the Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue 
test statistics was present. This implies a long-
run equilibrium relationship between the 
variables and therefore the short-run dynamics 






no. of CE(s) Eigenvalue statistic Critical value Prob.**
None *  0.572871  55.59030  47.85613  0.0079
At most 1  0.410458  27.51825  29.79707  0.0896
At most 2  0.238845  10.08072  15.49471  0.2746
At most 3  0.032034  1.074434  3.841466  0.2999
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Unrestricted	cointegration	rank	test	(maximum	eigenvalue)
Hypothesised Max-Eigen 0.05
no. of CE(s) Eigenvalue statistic Critical value Prob.**
None *  0.572871  28.07205  27.58434  0.0433
At most 1  0.410458  17.43753  21.13162  0.1523
At most 2  0.238845  9.006284  14.26460  0.2856
At most 3  0.032034  1.074434  3.841466  0.2999
 Max-Eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level





Error correction: D(CO) D(STRIKES) D(LS) D(RR)
cointegrating equation  0.017945  82.28092 –0.008275 –1.152313
 (0.01282)  (43.3332)  (0.00278)  (0.51809)
[1.39990] [1.89879] [–2.97234] [–2.22416]
Source: Eviews estimate; t-statistics in [ ]
The adjustment coefficients are shown in Table 
4. The small and insignificant coefficient of 
capital output (CO) indicates that it is weakly 
exogenous. The as (highlighted) in Table 4 
show that the labour share (LS) and the real 
rate (RR) enter the cointegrating equation 
significantly and it adjusts to equilibrium, since 
the coefficients are negative (meeting the 
stability condition). In the case of the labour 
share, adjustment towards equilibrium will be 
slow and moderate to quick for interest rates. 
The frequency of strikes’ coefficient is significant 
on a 90 per cent level and would move away from 
equilibrium (positive coefficient). Since not all 
the variables comply with the stability condition 
it implies that equilibrium might not be reached 
or take a very long time to return to equilibrium 
after a shock. 
The weak exogenous nature of capital 
output confirms that capital investment is not 
to be the overall result of sound economic 
decision making. Non-economic factors, like 
militancy, seem to play a cardinal role in 
investment decisions. Strikes seem to change 
long run investment behaviour, making capital 
a permanent rather than a cyclical substitute 
for labour. Militancy also nullified the positive 
effects of a regulated framework for the labour 
market.
This was confirmed by the impulse response 
function of generalised impulses (ordering not 
important) from Figure 1 below. Capital output 
(CO) reacts to strikes (first diagram) and moves 
away from equilibrium; capital output reacts to 
the labour share (LS) (second diagram) and 
moves towards equilibrium but at a very slow rate 
and capital output reacts to the real rate (RR) 
and moves back towards equilibrium rather 
quickly. This confirms results from previous 
studies that once labour is replaced by capital, 
reversal in the foreseeable future is not likely.
Figure	1	






The objective of this paper was to analyse the 
role labour conflict played in the persistence 
of underemployment in South Africa. The 
long period of economic growth, relatively low 
interest rates, low inflation and positive business 
sentiment in South Africa are not reflected in 
job creation. Arguments for the persistence of 
unemployment are based on the progressive 
growth in labour supply, the change in the 
nature of the demand for labour and a lack of 
growth in South Africa. The argument in this 
paper is that there is something structurally 
wrong with an economy and labour market 
that for a period of 20 years or longer cannot 
absorb and allocate surplus labour but instead 
moves to more capital-intensive modes of 
production, whether it is the result of frictions 
in the pricing mechanism or more fundamental 
reasons. The paper’s contribution to the 
debate on unemployment is to focus on labour 
conflict as a contributor to the persistence of 
underemployment in South Africa.
The role played by labour conflict in the 
persistence of underemployment in South 
Africa was analysed with the help of two models. 
Labour conflict in these models originates both 
from an over-regulated labour market, where 
labour appropriates capital, and from bad labour 
relations. In both models a switch in technology 
is the channel through which underemployment 
results. The frequency of strikes was used as a 
proxy for the relational conflict variable (BP 
model) and the compensation of employees to 
gross value added ratio was used as a proxy for 
the distributional conflict variable to represent 
labour share (CH model). These variables were 
used in conjunction with a dummy variable 
for intervention by institutions in favour of 
labour. The real interest rate and the HIV/
AIDS prevalence dummy were used as control 
variables for possible specification bias.
It was found that capital is crowded out by 
labour wage demands. Bad labour relations 
cannot be efficiently hedged by more capital 
intensive technology. Also skills shortages 
already at an early stage had a detrimental effect 
on production in South Africa.
A significant positive relationship between 
the relational conflict variable, frequencies 
of strikes, with the capital/output ratio was 
observed. This implies that as the frequency 
of strikes becomes higher the switch to capital 
is more likely. The small but highly significant 
coefficient is an indication that the hedging 
of uncertain labour by using more capital 
intensive methods has been completed. Bad 
labour relations contribute to the continued 
use of capital-intensive technology in South 
Africa and therefore play a role in explaining 
unemployment.
The significant results from the institutional 
dummy variable implies that when there is 
intervention by institutions in favour of labour 
the capital/output ratio declines. The regulation 
of the labour markets in South Africa as such, 
does not create unemployment, but relatively 
high and stable underemployment of labour in 
relation to capital. The high and persistent levels 
of unemployment are rather the result of bad 
labour relations. This finding corresponds with 
that of Blanchard & Phillipon (2006).
The real interest rate has a negative rela-
tionship to the capital/output ratio over a long 
period of 5 years. The finding confirms the views 
of both the Caballero and Hammour (CH) and 
Blanchard and Phillipon (BP) model on the 
inflexibility of capital intensive technology. The 
results indicate that as HIV/AIDS prevalence 
increases, the capital/output ratio will also 
increase. This variable was not as significant 
as expected and it seems that uncertainty in 
the labour market was already hedged but for 
reasons other than HIV/AIDS.
The cointegration analysis confirms results 
from previous studies that once labour is 
replaced by capital, reversal in the foreseeable 
future is not likely. It is therefore very doubtful 
whether the situation can be reversed in the 
near future due to the highly inelastic short-run 
and inflexible long-run nature of capital and the 
historical and social nature of conflict in the 
labour market. 
No automatic economic mechanism exists 
to rectify the remanence in underemployment 
because the factors underlying underemployment 
are of a historical, political and social nature. 
Classical employment policies cannot remedy the 
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historical and endemic nature of labour market 
conflict and remanence in underemployment 
in South Africa. Classical employment policies 
of low interest rates and high output growth 
to create jobs will probably contribute only to 
cyclical employment or could even give business 
the leverage to intensify the use of capital in 
production, at the cost of low skilled labour. It 
therefore seems that the presence and nature 
of conflict do not contribute to the welfare of 
labour – not even in the short run – but seem 
instead to counter the government’s efforts 
(regulation) to improve the wellbeing of labour 
as a production factor.
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F-statistic 0.705571     Prob. F(16,11) 0.7446
Obs*R-squared 14.18161     Prob. Chi-square(16) 0.5852




Date: 03/12/10 Time: 10:58
Sample: 1977 2004
Included observations: 28
Collinear test regressors dropped from specification
Variable Coefficient Std.	error t-statistic Prob.		
C –0.501645 1.658249 –0.302515 0.7679
LS(-7) 2.328121 5.930229 0.392585 0.7021
LS(-7)^2 –2.490345 5.303488 –0.469567 0.6478
LS(-7)*STRIKES(-2) 0.001052 0.000652 1.611888 0.1353
LS(-7)*RR(-5) 0.032893 0.056471 0.582475 0.5720
LS(-7)*DUM(-2) –0.071710 0.038966 –1.840349 0.0928
LS(-7)*AIDS(-3) –0.195869 0.824637 –0.237521 0.8166
STRIKES(-2) –0.000610 0.000363 –1.683599 0.1204
STRIKES(-2)^2 –2.74E-09 3.07E-08 –0.089234 0.9305
STRIKES(-2)*RR(-5) –2.08E-06 2.22E-06 –0.937032 0.3689
STRIKES(-2)*DUM(-2) –6.39E-05 0.000100 –0.638058 0.5365
STRIKES(-2)*AIDS(-3) 3.83E-05 2.40E-05 1.597031 0.1386
RR(-5) –0.016356 0.031728 –0.515504 0.6164
RR(-5)^2 –0.000155 0.000153 –1.008106 0.3351
RR(-5)*DUM(-2) 0.017746 0.020198 0.878599 0.3984
RR(-5)*AIDS(-3) 0.001057 0.002884 0.366594 0.7209
AIDS(-3) 0.078474 0.466070 0.168373 0.8693
R-squared 0.506486     Mean dependent var 0.004665
Adjusted R-squared –0.211353     S.D. dependent var 0.007439
S.E. of regression 0.008187     Akaike info criterion –6.492476
Sum squared resid 0.000737     Schwarz criterion –5.683638
Log likelihood 107.8947     Hannan-Quinn criter. –6.245207





F-statistic 0.057647     Prob. F(2,20) 0.9441




Date: 03/12/10 Time: 10:59
Sample: 1977 2004
Included observations: 28
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.
Variable Coefficient Std.	error t-statistic Prob.		
C 0.034116 0.519016 0.065732 0.9482
LS(-7) –0.063983 0.923474 –0.069285 0.9455
STRIKES(-2) 5.41E-06 4.79E-05 0.112942 0.9112
RR(-5) –0.000199 0.004181 –0.047537 0.9626
DUM(-2) –0.001931 0.061843 –0.031231 0.9754
AIDS(-3) 0.000807 0.043962 0.018367 0.9855
RESID(-1) –0.010814 0.273876 –0.039484 0.9689
RESID(-2) –0.084035 0.248758 –0.337819 0.7390
R-squared 0.005732     Mean dependent var –1.02E-16
Adjusted R-squared –0.342262     S.D. dependent var 0.069551
S.E. of regression 0.080579     Akaike info criterion –1.964208
Sum squared resid 0.129859     Schwarz criterion –1.583578
Log likelihood 35.49892     Hannan-Quinn criter. –1.847846




CO STRIKES LS RR
1 0.6235009313112387 –0.04670670492374031 0.2531346970598506
0.6235009313112387 1 0.1369744889818502 0.06673009173871417
–0.04670670492374031 0.1369744889818502 1 –0.1987465169268578
0.2531346970598506 0.06673009173871417 –0.1987465169268578 1
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